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ABSTRACT
We explore the determinants of research specialization across countries and its consequences for
relative wages. Using a dynamic Ricardian model we examine the effects of faster international
technology diffusion and lower trade barriers on the incentive to innovate. In the absence of any
diffusion at all, countries devote the same share of resources toward research regardless of trade
barriers or research productivity. As long as trade barriers are not too high, faster diffusion shifts
research activity toward the country that does it better. This shift in research activity raises the
relative wage there. It can even mean that, with more diffusion, the country better at research ends















Research indicators reveal strong and consistent patterns of specialization in innovation. Table
1 reports the number of business sector research scientists per thousand workers in industry
among OECD and selected non-OECD members, in descending order of research intensity. By
virtue of their size and high research intensity, most research is done in the United States and
Japan. Research-intensive countries tend to be wealthy, but some wealthy countries, such as
Australia and Italy, don￿ t do much private sector research. Moreover, with the exception of
the recent emergence of Finland as a research center, patterns of research specialization have
remained very stable over time. The countries contributing the most to innovation now are
mostly the same ones as half a century ago.1
What characteristics of a country determine specialization in research, and how does open-
ness a⁄ect the incentive to innovate? This question has been posed in a number of contexts in
which openness has meant di⁄erent things. It could refer to the absence of trade barriers, but
also to the absence of barriers to the di⁄usion of ideas themselves. While trade allows con-
sumers in another country to bene￿t from an innovation by importing a good that embodies
the idea, technology di⁄usion allows them to bene￿t through local production making use of
that idea. Expanding one conduit or the other may have very di⁄erent implications for the
incentive to innovate in either location. A related question is the role of country character-
istics in determining international patterns of specialization in innovative activity. Do large
countries, for example, naturally do more research because their inventors have quicker access
to a large internal market?
The literature on international technology di⁄usion is large. Keller (2004) provides a
comprehensive survey. A number of papers have looked at the e⁄ect of one type of openness
taking the degree of openness of the other type as given. Examples are Helpman (1993),
Eaton, Gutierrez, and Kortum (1998), Eaton and Kortum (henceforth EK) (1999), and EK
1Eaton, Gutierrez, and Kortum (1998), Eaton and Kortum (1999), Eaton and Kortum (2001a) provide
further analysis of research indicators across countries and over time.(2001b). Helpman (1993), for example, ￿nds that, with no trade costs, faster di⁄usion to an
imitating country can spur innovation by reducing the wage, and hence the cost of innovation,
in the innovating country. In a model with no di⁄usion, EK (2001b), ￿nd that the degree of
openness to trade has no e⁄ect on innovative activity: While exporting increases the size of
the market that a successful innovator can capture, it also means that an innovator faces a
higher hurdle in terms of competition from abroad through imports. The two forces exactly
o⁄set each other. In their model, unlike Helpman￿ s, all countries engage in innovative activity.
To explore these issues further we develop a two-region model, like Helpman￿ s, of innovation
and di⁄usion. In contrast to much of the literature, innovation can in principle take place in
either region, although research productivities may di⁄er. Ideas can di⁄use between locations,
but with a lag. We allow for an arbitrary level of trade barriers, with costless trade a special
case. We then explore the incentives to innovate under di⁄erent assumptions about the speed
of di⁄usion and about the magnitude of trade barriers.
While our model could be extended to analyze the implications of imperfect protection of
intellectual property, that is not our purpose here. To isolate the e⁄ects of geographical barriers
to the movement of goods and ideas, we make the simplest assumption for our purposes, that
innovators can appropriate the entire returns to their innovation at home and abroad.2
We proceed as follows:
Section 2 develops a static two-country model of technology, production, and trade along
the lines of the Ricardian model developed in EK (2002). In their many-country model,
the distribution of technologies is treated as independent from country to country. Such an
outcome is consistent, for example, with a world in which each country relies on its own
innovations for production, or one in which an innovation applying to a particular good in one
country applies to some di⁄erent good where it di⁄uses. Here we consider the more natural,
but much more complicated, case in which an innovation, when it di⁄uses, applies to the same
2The role of intellectual property protection was a main concern of Helpman (1993). The issue has been
revisited recently by Gancia (2003) and by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005).
2good. This extension forces us to distinguish between innovations that are in the exclusive
domain of the innovating country, and those that have di⁄used to a common pool that both
countries can access. Because of the many di⁄erent situations that can arise, we limit ourselves
to a two-country case. Even here we need to distinguish among situations in which: (i) one
country uses only those technologies that are exclusive to it, leaving the common technologies
to the other country, (ii) both countries use common technologies, with one country exporting
goods produced using these technologies to the other country, and (iii) both countries use
common technologies, with no trade in goods produced using them. The ￿rst case replicates
the situation in EK (2002), since the technologies that each country actually uses are drawn
from independent distributions. Di⁄usion has no impact on the extent of trade. In the second
two cases, di⁄usion substitutes for trade, as at least a range of the goods produced with the
common technology are nontraded. Nontradedness arises not because transport costs for these
goods are higher, but because similarities in e¢ ciency between countries have eliminated any
scope for exploiting comparative advantage.
Section 3 introduces simple dynamics into the analysis. Each country innovates at an
exogenous rate, and ideas di⁄use from one to another at exogenous rates. The processes of
innovation and di⁄usion generate a world steady-state growth rate in which the two countries,
depending on their abilities to innovate and to absorb ideas from abroad, have (except by
coincidence) di⁄erent relative income levels. The framework can deliver ￿product cycles,￿as
in Krugman (1979), in which the innovator initially exports the good using the technology it
has developed, but later imports it once the technology has di⁄used abroad. In our model
other outcomes are also possible. If the innovation is su¢ ciently small, before di⁄usion, the
other country may continue to produce the good on its own using inferior technology rather
than import the good from the innovator. In fact, its own technology could even be superior,
so that the innovation is never useful outside the country of innovation.
Section 4 endogenizes inventive activity. It ￿rst calculates the value of ideas in each country,
3which determine the returns to innovation. The trade-o⁄ between the returns to innovation
and to production governs the extent of inventive activity in each country. We consider the
role of openness in the form of (i) lower trade barriers and (ii) faster di⁄usion on inventive
activity in each country. A special case is no di⁄usion, returning us to EK (2001): Each country
allocates the same share of resources to invention regardless of its size or research productivity.
Turning to the other extreme of immediate di⁄usion, we ￿nd that the same result emerges if
the trade barrier exceeds the ratio of research productivities. But if the trade barrier is lower
than the ratio of research productivities, the more e¢ cient researcher specializes in innovation
along Ricardian lines.
Section 5 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Technology, Production, and Trade
Our production structure is Ricardian. Following Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977,
henceforth DFS), we consider a world with a unit continuum of goods, which we label by
j 2 [0;1]: There are two countries, which we label N (for North) and S (for South). Each
country has a set of available technologies for making each of the goods on the continuum. Some
technologies, denoted N; are available only to the North while another set, S; are available
exclusively to the South. A third set C are commonly available. A technology is the ability to
produce zi(j) units of good j with one worker, where, depending on which type of technology
we are talking about, i = N;S;C. (It is convenient for us to use i to index both the three
types of technologies i = N;S;C and the two countries i = N;S that have exclusive knowledge
of technologies i = N;S respectively.)
We treat the zi(j)￿ s as realizations of random variables Zi drawn independently for each j
from the FrØchet distributions:
Fi(z) = Pr[Zi ￿ z] = exp[￿Tiz￿￿] (1)
which are independent across i = N;S;C: In this static context the Ti￿ s re￿ ect the average
4e¢ ciencies across the three sets of technologies. (We consider how these distributions arise
from a dynamic process of innovation and di⁄usion in Sections 3 and 4.)
The best technologies available in country i are realizations of:
Z￿
i = maxfZi;ZCg i = N;S:
Thus the random variable Z￿
i has distribution:
F￿
i (z) = Pr[Z￿
i ￿ z] = exp[￿T￿
i z￿￿]
where T￿
i = Ti + TC: The T￿
i re￿ ect the average e¢ ciencies across the set of technologies
available to country i = N;S:
EK (2002) consider a case in which there is no common technology, so that TC = 0: An
implication is that the distributions of e¢ ciencies available to each country are independent.
Here there is independence across the exclusive technologies, but the common technologies
induce a positive correlation between Z￿
N and Z￿
S: Because of this correlation we will ￿nd it
easier to work with the three independent technology distributions of ZN;ZS; and ZC.
As is standard in a Ricardian setting, workers are identical and mobile across activities
within a country, but cannot change countries. The wage is wN in the North and wS in
the South. We take the wage in the South to be the numeraire, although we leave wS in
formulas for clarity. Labor market clearing conditions, introduced below, establish the relative
wage. Without loss of generality we will impose restrictions on exogenous variables so that in
equilibrium wN ￿ wS.3
As in DFS, demand is Cobb-Douglas, which we further simplify by assuming that expen-
diture shares are the same across goods. Hence expenditure in country i on good j is:
Xi(j) = Xi;
where Xi is total expenditure.4
3Below we consider the case in which technologies and the labor forces evolve over time. Since in this section
we solve the static equilibrium given these magnitudes, we omit time subscripts for now.
4A generalization to CES preferences is straightforward. See, for example, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003).
5Also as in DFS, goods can be transported between the countries, but in order to deliver one
unit to the destination d ￿ 1 units need to be shipped from the source (the standard ￿iceberg"
assumption). Unfortunately, even in low-dimensional Ricardian problems, taxonomies are
inevitable. There are three cases to consider: (1) If wN > wSd then the commonly available
technologies are used only in the South; the North uses only those technologies unique to it.
(2) If wN = wSd then the commonly available technologies may be used in both countries, but
goods produced using these technologies are exported only by the South. (3) If wN < wSd
then each country will use the commonly available technologies. Goods produced using these
technologies aren￿ t traded since it￿ s more expensive to import the good than to make it oneself.
2.1 Cost Distributions
To mitigate the proliferation of special cases, we introduce the term wni to indicate the e⁄ective
wage, inclusive of transport cost, for goods sold in country n produced using technology i: Here
n = N;S and i = N;S;C: Taking the case of the Northern market, wNN = wN and wNS =
wSd; while wNC = minfwSd;wNg is the wage paid to labor producing goods using the common
technologies and sold in the North (including transport cost should the South be the sole user).
Hence wNC=zC(j) is the cost of selling good j in the North if it is produced using a common
technology. In the ￿rst case above wNC = wSd < wN, in the second wNC = wN = wSd, and
in the third wNC = wN < wSd. For the Southern market wSS = wSC = wS and wSN = dwN.










6Note that, for all goods j, the ratio of costs is bounded above and below by d ￿ cS(j)=cN(j) ￿
1=d; with equality on the left if N exports j to S and equality on the right if S exports j to
N:
For i = N;S; the lowest cost ci(j) is the realization of a random variable Ci whose dis-
tribution derives from the distribution of the underlying technologies Zi: We denote the cost
distribution in i by Hi(c) = Pr[Ci ￿ c]. The cost distribution in the North is:
HN(c) = 1 ￿ Pr[ZN ￿ wN=c]Pr[ZS ￿ wSd=c]Pr[ZC ￿ wNC=c]
= 1 ￿ FN(wN=c)FS(wSd=c)FC(wNC=c)






N + TS(wSd)￿￿ + TCw￿￿
NC:
Similarly, for the South:





￿S = TN(wNd)￿￿ + TSw￿￿
S + TCw￿￿
S :
We can summarize these results on the cost distributions, for n = N;S, as










As in EK (2002), the probability that country n will ￿nd technology of type i the lowest






where n = N;S and i = N;S;C: The di⁄erence from EK (2002) is that the sources are not
necessarily countries, but rather sets of technologies.
72.2 Trade Patterns and Wages
We now complete the description of the static equilibrium by describing how labor market
clearing determines wages in each country, and characterize patterns of trade. We posit that
each country i has LP
i production workers i = N;S: To keep things simple, here we assume
perfect competition, introducing Bertrand competition in Section 4 where we endogenize in-
novation.
Under many standard assumptions about market structure (including perfect competition
or Bertrand competition), ￿ni de￿ned in (2) is the fraction of country n￿ s expenditure devoted
to goods produced with technology of type i: If Xn is total spending by country n; spending
on labor producing goods using exclusively Northern technologies is:
wNLE
N = ￿NNXN + ￿SNXS: (3)
Here LE
N is the measure of Northern workers using exclusively Northern technologies.
We now need to distinguish among the three kinds of equilibria:
2.2.1 Case 1: The North uses only its Exclusive Technologies
In this case, LE
N = LP
N; where LP
N are all Northern workers engaged in production. Since only
the South uses commonly available technologies, wNC = wSd: The solution needs to satisfy
wN > dwS in order for the North not to use them.
Under perfect competition, all LP
i workers in each country are engaged in production and
labor is the only source of income, so that Xi = wiLP
i : In this case expression (3) above,




















where, as de￿ned above, T￿
S = TS+TC: While the equation does not admit an analytic solution,
it is easy to solve numerically.
Since the North does not use the common technologies, all goods produced are equally
tradeable regardless of which type of technology they employ. The fact that the North has
8access to common technologies is irrelevant since it doesn￿ t use them. The outcome is isomor-
phic to one in which the North knows only the technologies that are exclusive to it, while the
common technologies are exclusive to the South, as in EK (2002).
2.2.2 Case 2: The North and the South both use Common Technologies, with
Trade in Some Goods Produced using Them
In this case wNC = wN = wSd. Hence the relative wage is pinned down by the transport cost,

















where TW = TN +TC +TS; a measure of world technology. For this case to emerge parameter
values must be such that LE
N=LP
N not exceed one. Otherwise we are in Case 1 above. We also
need the demand for workers using the South￿ s exclusive technologies LE
S not to exceed the
















not exceed one. Otherwise we are in Case 3 below.
In Case 2 the range of goods produced using common technologies in the North are not
traded. Hence, unlike case 1, technology di⁄usion results in less trade than otherwise. Di⁄usion
substitutes for trade.
2.2.3 Case 3: Goods Produced with Common Technologies are not Traded
In this case wNC = wN < wSd: Labor market equilibrium requires a wage wN that solves:
wNLP
N = (￿NN + ￿NC)XN + ￿SNXS;



















9where, as de￿ned above, T￿
N = TN +TC and T￿
S = TS+TC: Again, there is no analytic solution,
but solving for the wage numerically is straightforward.
Here all goods produced with common technologies are not traded. Technology di⁄usion
reduces the scope for trade even further.
2.3 Trade and Prices
What is the relationship between technology, wages, and prices in each of these cases? In
Cases 1 and 2 the wage in the North is higher than that in the South by a factor of at least d
while the prices of goods produced using common technologies are higher by a factor of exactly
d. Hence the real wage in the North is higher.
In Cases 2 and 3, some or all goods made with the common technologies are produced in
both countries. Since the wage is higher in the North these goods are more expensive there,
delivering the (Balassa-Samuelson) implication that the relative price of untraded goods is
lower in the South.
3 Simple Technology Dynamics
We have so far considered the static equilibrium in which parameters of the technology distri-
bution are given. Over time, however, we can envisage processes of innovation and di⁄usion
governing the evolution of the Tit￿ s (introducing a time subscript). We ￿rst follow the spec-
i￿cation in Krugman (1979), for example, which allows us to stick with perfect competition:
Each country innovates at an exogenous rate that is proportional to its current knowledge, and
ideas ￿ ow from the exclusive to the common pool at rates that are proportional to the stocks of
exclusive ideas. We introduce four parameters, ￿N; the rate at which the North innovates, ￿S;
the rate at which the South innovates, ￿N; the rate at which the South learns about exclusively
Northern ideas, and ￿S; the rate at which the North learns about exclusively Southern ideas:
10Thus TNt; TSt; and TCt evolve according to:
:
TNt = (￿N ￿ ￿N)TNt + ￿NTCt = ￿NT￿
Nt ￿ ￿NTNt
:
TSt = (￿S ￿ ￿S)TSt + ￿STCt = ￿ST￿
St ￿ ￿STSt
:
TCt = ￿NTNt + ￿STSt:
While the analytic solution to this dynamic system is complex, it is straightforward to show
that as long as the innovation and di⁄usion parameters are strictly positive and the initial
value of at least one Ti is positive, the system evolves to a steady state in which all three types
of knowledge grow at the same rate.
In general, the resulting growth rate of technology is the solution to an unpleasant cubic
equation. It can be shown, however, that the steady-state growth rate is increasing in both
the innovation and di⁄usion parameters (see, e.g., EK, 1999). In the special case of symmetry,
￿N = ￿S = ￿; and ￿N = ￿S = ￿; the steady-state growth rate is merely quadratic:
gT =






strictly increasing in ￿ and ￿: A world with more innovation but also more di⁄usion grows
faster. Krugman (1979) considers a special case in which only the North innovates, so that
iS = 0 and the growth rate is just ￿N while TS = 0:
4 Endogenizing Innovation
We now extend the model to endogenize innovation. We continue to assume that exclusive
ideas ￿ ow into common knowledge at a common exogenous rate ￿.
As in Kortum (1997), we model innovation as the production of ideas. An idea is a way to
produce a good j with output per worker q: We assume that an idea is equally likely to apply
to any good in the unit interval, and that q is the realization of a random variable Q drawn
from the Pareto distribution:
Pr[Q ￿ q] = 1 ￿ q￿￿ q ￿ 1: (6)
11Only an idea that lowers the cost of serving a market will be used.
This distribution of the e¢ ciency of new ideas is consistent with our distributional assump-
tion in Section 2 about the best technologies culled from past ideas. To see why, consider how
one new idea will interact with the set of existing technologies in i = N;S;C. It adds to that
set if and only if Q > Zi, which occurs with probability:













where the approximation is arbitrarily close for large Ti. We can use this result to derive the
distribution of Q conditional on Q > Zi:
Pr[Q ￿ qjQ > Zi] =
Z q
0


















Thus, conditional on joining the set of best technologies, the quality of a new idea inherits the
distribution of the quality of existing technologies. The FrØchet distribution is passed along
over time as its parameter Ti increases with innovative e⁄ort.
Initially, ideas from country n are usable only for production there. Hence, for an idea
from country n to lower the cost of producing good j for the home market, q must satisfy:
wn=q ￿ cn(j) = min
i=N;S;C
fwni=zi(j)g
where zN(j); zS(j), and zC(j) represent the states of the art in the exclusively Northern,
exclusively Southern, and commonly available technologies, respectively. (Recall that wni is
12the transport cost-inclusive wage applying to technology i in market n.) To lower the cost of
of producing good j for the foreign market m 6= n it must satisfy:
wnd=q ￿ cm(j) = min
i=N;S;C
fwmi=zi(j)g:
Given the current local cost cn(j) of good j; the probability that a local innovation will lower
cost is:
Pr[wn=Q ￿ cn(j)] = Pr[Q ￿ wn=cn(j)] = [wn=cn(j)]￿￿
while given the cost in the foreign market m; cm(j); the probability that it lowers cost abroad
is:
Pr[wnd=Q ￿ cm(j)] = Pr[Q ￿ wnd=cm(j)] = [wnd=cm(j)]￿￿:
Since, with the possibility of trade, the cost of a good can never di⁄er between countries by
a factor greater than d; and can di⁄er by less, the criterion for exporting is tougher. Small
innovations may be used to produce only for the home market, while larger ones will be used
for export as well.
4.1 The Distribution of the Markup
We need to introduce an incentive for innovation. We follow the quality-ladders framework
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and posit that the owner of an
innovation has the ability to use it to produce and sell a product at the highest price that
keeps the competition at bay. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, this price equals the unit cost
using the next best technology. The resulting markup of price over unit cost on a particular
good is the ratio of the cost of producing it using the previous technology to the cost of
producing it using the latest technology.
Consider some new idea in technology class i = N;S;C which could be used to produce
a particular good for market n = N;S. The idea may or may not be of any economic value.
The latent markup using the idea is M￿
nit = Cnt=(wni=Q) (where capital letters denote random
13variables). The e¢ ciency of the idea, Q, is drawn from the distribution (6) while the cost using
the previous technology, Cnt, is drawn independently from the relevant cost distribution:





If the latent markup is less than one, of course, the idea will not be used in market n at all. If
the latent markup exceeds one the idea will be used, the good will sell at price Cnt in market
n, and the actual markup there will equal the latent markup.
The probability that the latent markup exceeds some value m is:
bnit(m) = Pr[M￿



















where the last approximation becomes exact as ￿nt gets large. (Since we consider a steady
state in which wni is constant, we do not index it by t.) For the good to be sold, of course,










The distribution of the markup is equal to the distribution of the latent markup conditional




= 1 ￿ m￿￿ n = N;S; i = N;S;C;
the Pareto distribution with parameter ￿, for m ￿ 1. Note that the distribution of the markup
is invariant to the technology class i, the market n, or the date t.
14Integrating across the markup distribution G(m); the expected ￿ ow of pro￿t from an idea




(1 ￿ m￿1)dG(m) =
Xnt
1 + ￿
; n = N;S
which is also the total pro￿t generated in country n: The fraction of total pro￿t earned by
using technology of type i = N;S;C in market n is ￿ni: Taking into account the probability
that an idea will be useful in that country, the expected pro￿t in market n of an idea from







As time passes, Xnt and Tit both grow. The ￿rst causes expected pro￿t from an idea to rise
over time as the size of the market grows. The second causes expected pro￿t from the idea
to fall over time through the hazard of losing the market to a cheaper source of production.
Conditional on still being of value, one idea is just like any other in terms of the distribution
of its quality Q; regardless of when it was invented.
We denote the aggregate price level in country n at time t by Pnt. Cobb-Douglas preferences
dictate that the price level be calculated as the geometric mean of individual prices in country
n. The price of each good in country n is the product of the unit cost of producing it and its
markup. Thus,

















where ￿ is Euler￿ s constant (.5772...).5
With these expressions in hand we are now armed to calculate the value of ideas.
5Another way to derive this expression for the price level is to note that with Bertrand competition, the
price of a good is the second lowest cost of producing it, which we denote by C
(2)
nt . This second lowest cost in
country n has distribution:
H
(2)







(See equation (8) of Bernard, Eaton Jensen, and Kortum, 2003, setting c1 = c2:). The price level in country n
154.2 The Value of Ideas
Taking into account possible di⁄usion, as well as changes in the price level, the expected real





















where ￿ is the discount rate. The expression ￿NiXNt + ￿SiXSt is total spending on goods
made with technologies of type i.
We assume that both labor forces grow at rate gL; with LN = ￿LS: We require that
gL=￿ < ￿: In steady state, wages and the ￿ni are constant, while the T￿ s grow at rate gT; so
that prices fall at rate gT=￿: Pro￿t is a constant share of income, which also grows at rate gL:
Because of royalty payments on technologies used for domestic production that were in-
vented abroad, we need to distinguish country i￿ s income Xit; which includes net royalty income
from abroad, from its output, which we denote Yit: We can write the income of country i; Xit;
in terms of outputs Yit and Ynt; n 6= i; as:







where !ni is the share of the technology used in country n owned by inventors from country
i: Since labor income from production in country i is wiLP
it; where LP
it denotes production


































16We use these expressions for income in deriving the value of ideas in the various cases we
consider below.
4.3 The Rate of Innovation
As is common in the endogenous growth literature, we introduce a production function for
innovation, with country i having research productivity ￿i; i = N;S: The rate at which ideas
in technology i are created is thus ￿iritLit; i = N;S; where ri is the share of country i0s labor
force doing research and Li is its total labor force. We assume that an idea transits from either
exclusive technology into the common technology with a common hazard ￿:
We de￿ne the ratio of technology exclusive to country i to country i workers at time t as














￿ (gL + ￿):
In steady state both ri and ti are constant, so that ti = ￿iri=(gL + ￿) and gT = gL: Finally,
de￿ning tCt = TCt=(TNt + TSt); the ratio of common to exclusive technologies, tC evolves
according to:
:







Thus in steady state tC is constant and equals ￿=gL:
Since in steady state gT = gL; our expression for the value of ideas (7) becomes:
Vit =
1















where the Xit are given by (8) above, where i;n = N;S; i 6= n:
In an equilibrium in which workers in a country engage simultaneously in production and
in innovation, the return to each activity should be equal. More generally, the conditions for
17labor market equilibrium are that:
￿iVit = wit rit 2 [0;1] (10)
￿iVit ￿ wit rit = 0
￿iVit ￿ wit rit = 1
for i = N;S:
A steady-state equilibrium is a solution for rN; rS; and wN=wS consistent with (10) and
product market clearing as derived in Section 2.
4.4 Steady State Research and Growth
Because of the taxonomy of situations that can arise, we avoid trying to provide a general
analytic solution. But under each of four particular assumptions about di⁄usion and trade
barriers the model yields insight into the e⁄ects of globalization on research: (i) no di⁄usion
(￿ = 0), (ii) instantaneous di⁄usion (￿ ! 1), (iii) no trade. (d ! 1); and (iv) costless trade
(d = 1). As these four cases circumnavigate the full range of possibilities, they provide insight
into the general solution:
4.4.1 No Di⁄usion
Setting ￿ = 0 gives us EK (2001b). Each country has to use its own ideas for production.
Hence, spending on goods produced with ideas exclusive to country i corresponds with the
total production of country i; Yit = ￿NiXNt + ￿SiXSt: Substituting this expression into value





In steady state all countries do the same amount of research relative to their labor forces
regardless of their size or their research productivity. Since there are no common technologies,
we are in Case 1 above.
We now explore how much international technology di⁄usion upsets this stark result.
184.4.2 Instantaneous Di⁄usion
Consider the opposite case in which di⁄usion is instantaneous (￿ ! 1): Now all ideas are
common, so that ￿nC = 1; n = N;S: Since all ideas di⁄use immediately they have the same




wNLN(1 ￿ rN) + wSLS(1 ￿ rS)
TC
:
Since the South can use all the same technologies as the North, for the North to engage in
production requires that wN ￿ wSd: (Remember that wN ￿ wS throughout our analysis.)
What happens depends on the relative size of ￿N=￿S and d:
1. Say that ￿N=￿S ￿ d: Then, as long as the North continues to produce, wN = wSd and
we are in Case 2 above. The North does all the research (rS = 0): The share of workers




(1 + 1=d￿) (11)
(which cannot exceed one). Note that, compared with the case of no di⁄usion, the amount
of research is higher in the North in proportion to the relative size of the South (1=￿)
discounted by the trade barrier (1=d). Because of this discounting, the number of people
engaged in research in the world is smaller than with no di⁄usion. But since ￿N=￿S ￿ d;
e⁄ective research is higher since Northern research workers are more productive. This
condition is what ensures that if the North is both producing and doing research then
the South does not ￿nd research worthwhile. In this equilibrium the South runs a trade
surplus with the North to pay for the ideas it uses in production. The location of
production of any particular good is indeterminate.6
6If the South is very large compared to the North (￿ near 0) then the value of rN in expression (11) can
exceed one. In this case the North will specialize completely in research (rN = 1) and wN can exceed wSd:
Depending on parameter values, the South might ￿nd research worthwhile as well. We leave this case as an
exercise.
192. Say instead that ￿N=￿S ￿ d: We are in Case 3 above. Both countries will do research,
and the relative wage will re￿ ect research productivity, i.e., wN=wS = ￿N=￿S ￿ d:
Since the trade barrier exceeds the wage di⁄erence, each country will produce its own
goods. Since there is no goods trade, royalty payments must balance, which requires





as in the case of no di⁄usion.
Hence our Ricardian assumptions yield starkly Ricardian results. If research productivity
di⁄erences exceed trade barriers, countries specialize in research according to comparative
advantage. But if di⁄erences in research productivity fall short of trade barriers, countries do
their own research, while making use of each other￿ s ideas. Knowledge ￿ ows rather than good
￿ ows are how countries bene￿t from each other￿ s innovation.
What about the more realistic scenario in which ideas cross borders, but only with delay?
Special situations without trade and with costless trade deliver insight, although the results
are not as clean, demanding numerical simulation.
4.4.3 No Trade
Say that trade barriers are so high that there is no trade (d ! 1): This assumption was
implicit in the model used to estimate innovation and di⁄usion among the top ￿ve research
economies in EK (1999).7
Without trade in goods, royalty payments need to balance, so that Xn = Yn; n = N;S:
We can also set: ￿nn = Tn=(Tn + TC); ￿ni = 0; n 6= i; and TnC = TC=(Tn + TC); i;n = N;S:
7The model in EK (1999) di⁄ers in several respects. For one thing, ideas in that paper are about inputs, which
are not traded. But costless trade in ￿nal output allows for unbalanced royalty payments. For another, that
paper allows for diminishing returns to research activity at the national level. Diminishing returns are needed
to reconcile observations on the small share of workers doing research and their apparently large contribution
to productivity growth. Since our purpose here is a better understanding of the properties of the basic model
rather than a realistic application to data, we do not introduce this complication here. Finally, that model
allows for imperfect protection of innovations, both at home and abroad.

















for i;n = N;S; i 6= n: The ￿rst term on the right-hand side represents the value of the
idea at home and the second its value abroad. Since goods aren￿ t traded, di⁄usion into the
common pool has no implication for the value at home, while any return from abroad must
await di⁄usion.










wNLN(1 ￿ rN): (14)
Substituting expression (14) into (13) and solving for steady-state values of TN;TS; and TC





















D = (￿ + ￿)￿ ￿ gL:
There is no analytic solution for the general case, although with ￿ = 0 or ￿ ! 1 we
of course get back to rN = rS = gL=￿￿: Imposing symmetry (A = 1) we get the following









(￿ + 2￿)￿ ￿ gL




Note that G is the product of two fractions, the ￿rst exceeding one and the second less than
one. If G = 1 we are back to r = gL=￿￿: The ￿rst fraction re￿ ects the added opportunities for
earning royalties abroad that di⁄usion allows, which increases the incentive to do research. The
second re￿ ects the fact that, with di⁄usion, foreign ideas compete with domestic ones at home,
reducing research incentives. Which e⁄ect dominates depends on particular parameter values.
More di⁄usion means more research if gL=￿￿ exceeds 1=(1 + ￿) and vice versa. Simulations
suggest that deviations from r = gL=￿￿ are small regardless.
What about the role of country size, as measured by A? Researchers in a larger country
face less competition from foreign ideas, but have a smaller foreign market in which to earn
royalties. In fact, our simulations reveal that the direction of the e⁄ect of country size on
research intensity depends on parameter values.







In the symmetric case research intensity in each country is :057 (compared with :063 with no
di⁄usion). We ￿nd that increasing the relative size of the North by a factor of 10 leads research
activity there to increase to a labor share of :062 while the share in the South falls to :051:
Raising gL to :02; however, reverses the e⁄ect of size on research activity (although deviations
from symmetry are slight).
4.4.4 Costless trade
Say that trade is frictionless, meaning that d = 1: Case 3, with each country producing its
own goods with the common technology, is, except by coincidence, eliminated as a possibility.
If parameter values leave us in Case 2 above, then the wage in the two economies is identical,
22as are the value of ideas. If research productivity in the South is lower, only the North will
undertake research. If the return is the same the location of research is indeterminate. In either
case the world share of world labor engaged in research is the same as the closed economy
value of gL=￿￿:8
More interesting is a set of parameter values that leave us in Case 1 above, with the North-
ern wage above the South￿ s. In this case the North uses only its own exclusive technologies, but
earns royalties from technologies that have di⁄used into the common technology and are used
in the South. The expression for the value of ideas, (9) above, simpli￿es by recognizing that
spending on goods produced using Northern technologies is the same as spending on goods
produced by Northern workers. Hence:




Only the South uses commonly available technologies, while it also uses its own exclusive
technologies. Total spending on goods produced by Southern workers is thus:




Southern production using common technologies is




while Southern production using exclusively Southern technologies is


















￿￿NrN￿ + (gL + ￿)￿SrS
gL(gL + ￿)
:
8This outcome requires that the share of the world labor force in the North exceed gL=￿￿: Otherwise the
North will specialize completely in research, and its wage can be higher. Again, we leave this case as an exercise.
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gL + ￿







￿￿NrN￿ + (gL + ￿)￿SrS
:
Solving for the steady-state levels of rN and rS gives:
rN =
gL + ￿















To solve for the relative wage we need to refer back to our solution (4) for the static case
above, setting d = 1 and replacing LP













Case 1 requires, of course, that wN=wS > 1: This solution also requires that rS exceed zero.
For many parameter values, the South will end up doing no research at all. We don￿ t explore
this situation further, focusing on outcomes in which both countries continue to do research.
Note that rN and the wage ratio wN=wS can be solved in terms of each other, with rS
determined as a function of rN: Of course with no di⁄usion we are back to rN = rS = gL=￿￿:
With di⁄usion (￿ > 0) Northern research rises above this level while Southern research declines.
More generally, greater di⁄usion shifts research in the direction of greater research productivity.
Further analysis of equations (15) and (16) establishes that: (i) an increase in the relative
research productivity of the North (￿N=￿S) raises the relative wage (wN=wS) there, but by
a smaller percentage amount (so that the relative cost of doing research in the North falls);
(ii) as a consequence, research shifts to the North; (iii) more di⁄usion (a higher ￿) raises the
relative wage of the North. While the ￿rst two results are predictable, the third contrasts with
the outcome that would occur with exogenous research e⁄ort, such as in Krugman (1979). In
that case more di⁄usion, by reducing the stock of exclusively Northern technologies, lowers
the Northern wage. Two forces here work in the opposite direction. First, increased di⁄usion
24raises the demand for Northern workers as researchers. Second, the fact that the North is doing
more research mitigates the e⁄ect of di⁄usion on the ratio of exclusive Northern technologies
to those available in the South. In fact, as we discuss below, more di⁄usion can have the
paradoxical e⁄ect of lowering the fraction of technologies available to the South as greater
Northern research increases the pool of exclusively Northern technologies.






With no di⁄usion (￿ = 0) a fraction .0625 of workers in each country pursue research, and the
relative wage is 1:20 times higher in the North. The ratio of Northern technologies to those
available in the South is :50. Raising di⁄usion so that ￿ = :005 raises the share of researchers
in the North to :254 and lowers it in the South to :023: The Northern wage advantage rises to
a factor of 1:37: Taking into account the higher productivity of researchers in the North, along
with the smaller number of workers there, the e⁄ective level of research in the world rises by
60 percent. For the reason explained above, the ratio of exclusively Northern to technologies
available in the South rises to 1:30:9
5 Conclusion
What does our analysis suggest about the implications of globalization, either in the form of
greater di⁄usion of ideas or of lower trade barriers, for research incentives? And what role does
country size play? In our base case with no di⁄usion, countries engage in the same amount of
research regardless of their relative size and research productivity. Openness to trade doesn￿ t
alter research specialization. More research productive countries are richer, since the same
research e⁄ort yields more new technology.
9The direction of the e⁄ect of greater di⁄usion on this last ratio depends on parameter values. Giving the
North less of a research advantage (￿N=￿S = 1:1) while making it larger (￿ = 1) means that more di⁄usion
raises the share of technologies available in the South, but, as discussed above, lowers the relative wage in the
South.
25Jumping to a world with instantaneous di⁄usion can have a major e⁄ect on the allocation
of research activity, or none at all, depending on the importance of trade barriers relative
to di⁄erences in research productivity. When di⁄erences in research productivity are more
pronounced, instantaneous di⁄usion leads to Ricardian specialization. But if trade barriers are
more signi￿cant, countries continue to do the same amount of research as with no di⁄usion.
Given the amount of di⁄usion, a lowering of trade barriers can lead to more specialization in
research.
Intermediate levels of di⁄usion deliver less stark results. Under plausible parameter values
we ￿nd a tendency for greater di⁄usion to shift research toward countries with greater research
productivity.
While more trade and di⁄usion may cause research activity to shift across countries, our
analysis provides little to suggest that greater openness of either form will increase research
e⁄ort overall. Globalization, either in the form of lower trade barriers or more rapid di⁄usion,
provides researchers larger markets, but also exposes them to more competition.
Even in our relatively simple model, intermediate levels of di⁄usion imply complex patterns
of specialization in research. Size can matter, but the direction of the e⁄ect is ambiguous. It
is not surprising, then, that we see some of the largest and smallest nations among the most
active researchers. At the same time, there is reason to think that countries that do more
research do so because they are better at it.
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28COUNTRY Scientists Income Population
Finland 12.2 69 5176
United States 10.2 100 275423
Japan 9.8 73 126919
Sweden 7.7 69 8871
Luxembourg 6.8 138 441
Russia 6.6 28 145555
Belgium 6.2 70 10254
Norway 6.0 90 4491
Canada 5.9 81 30750
Germany 5.5 67 82168
Singapore 5.3 80 4018
France 5.1 66 60431
Denmark 4.5 80 5338
Ireland 4.4 76 3787
Korea 4.2 42 47275
United Kingdom 4.2 68 59756
Taiwan 4.2 55 21777
Austria 3.9 70 8110
Netherlands 3.6 72 15920
Australia 2.4 76 19157
Slovenia 2.0 48 1988
Spain 1.8 53 39927
New Zealand 1.7 56 3831
Italy 1.6 64 57728
Slovak Republic 1.6 35 5401
Czech Republic 1.4 42 10272
Hungary 1.4 31 10024
Romania 1.4 14 22435
Poland 0.8 27 38646
Portugal 0.7 48 10005
China 0.7 11 1258821
Greece 0.5 44 10558
Turkey 0.2 21 66835
Mexico 0.1 27 97221
and Aten (2002).
TABLE 1
Business Sector Research Scientists
Population is in 1000's
(per 1000 Industrial Workers)
Data are for 2000 or the previous available year
Income is relative to the United States (100)
Sources: OECD (2004) and Heston, Summers,